THE Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 19591 marks a new era in the legal regulation of internal union affairs. Congress has clearly affirmed the public interest in protecting democratic processes in unions, and it has explicitly protected union members in the free exercise of those political rights essential for self-government. Although Congress has declared the central policy of protecting union democracy and has enunciated essential rights, it has placed on the courts the responsibility of giving body and life to those rights. The rights guaranteed by Title I, the Bill of Rights, are stated in broad terms, and are enforceable through civil suits brought by union members. The courts must give content to those rights and devise remedies to make them meaningful. Title IV, regulating union elections, though more detailed, also contains broad provisions, and again the courts are responsible for giving them meaning and making them effective.2 Although legislative regulation is new, judicial involvement is not, for state courts have been adjudicating internal union disputes for more than sixty years.3 To some degree they have been protecting many of the same rights now guaranteed by the statute. Senator Kennedy, in opposing inclusion of a Bill of Rights, argued that broader protection of these rights was already tProfessor of Law, Yale Law School. 1. 73 Stat. 518, 29 U.S.C. ?? 153, 158-60, 187, 401-531 (Supp. 1959). 2. Sections 402-03. Section 402 provides that violations of Title IV may be remedied through filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor. If he finds probable cause to be--lieve a violation has occurred, he is required to bring an action in the federal district court to remedy the violation. Under ? 403, this procedure is the exclusive remedy for challenging an election already conducted. This procedure obviously gives the Secretary of Labor some practical discretion in determining whether to initiate an action, but the responsibility for interpreting and applying the statute and for designing the appropriate remedy ultimately rests on the court.
15. Even within the area of discretionary jurisdiction occupied by the Board, protection is far from perfect, for subtle discriminations in the assigning of jobs at the hiring hall or in the handling of grievances are often difficult to prove.
16. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Green, 72 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. 1947). For the disciplined individual, however, it is a distinct and critical interest, for the member's very fear of loss of his job represses his exercise of his membership rights. When this fear is realized, the member's willingness and ability to fight back either in the union or in the courts is undermined.
-Judicial Repudiation of Constitutional Provisions
The contract theory may itself obligate courts to repudiate or rewrite constitutional provisions, for established contract doctrine requires that provisions contrary to public policy be nullified. In Madden v. Atkins,20 union members who had issued "smear sheets" attacking the incumbent officers during an election campaign, and had organized an opposition group within the union to criticize union policies and support candidates, were expelled for "dual unionism." In holding the expulsion illegal, the Court of Appeals said:
If there be any public policy touching the government of labor unions, and there can be no doubt that there is, it is that traditionally democratic means of improving their union may be freely availed of by members without fear of harm or penalty. And this necessarily includes the right to criticize current union leadership and, within the union, to oppose such leadership and its policies. (See Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 284, supra.) The price of free expression and of political opposition within a union can not be the risk of expulsion or other disciplinary action.21
Regardless of how explicitly the constitution might prohibit such conduct and how clear-cut the evidence that it had been violated, the discipline would be illegal as violating public policy. The court thus uses contract logic to excise terms of the contract and to protect that which'the constitution makes pun- ishable.22 Rewriting procedural provisions is much more direct and far-reaching. Trial procedures which deny the basic elements of fairness are "contrary to 
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natural justice" and void, even though in accord with the constitution.23 "[Both] good conscience and law demand, that no member shall be deprived of his rights and privileges until he has had notice of the charges and been given an opportunity to meet them."24 If the constitution does not prescribe these, the courts will intervene to supply the omission.25 Provisions describing appellate procedure within the union and' requiring exhaustion before a member may resort to the courts do not normally receive even this verbal curtsy. They are either wholly ignored or swallowed up in the courts' own rules requiring exhaustion, and made subject to judicially created exceptions.26.
Judicial Interpretation of Constitutional Provisions
The contract theory gives the courts an additional, though more subtle role in regulating union discipline by placing in them the power to interpret discipline provisions.27 Restrictive interpretations may invalidate, or liberal interpretations may affirm, union disciplinary action; the choice in each case lies largely with the court, though often the availability of choice is so obscured that the judge's role appears mechanically neutral. In Gleeson v. Conrad 28 members of the opposition political group were expelled for refusing to obey the orders of the local president. The court ordered reinstatement because the constitution prohibited only disobedience of the international president. This simple reading of the words glossed over the fact that the local union had adopted the international constitution as its own, and that the court could have as plausibly interpreted it to fit the local union.
Provisions defining punishable offenses commonly include catch-all clauses which can be stretched to reach any conduct.29 Thus, obtaining admission by false representation can be punished as action which "tends to injury of the v. Brown 39 the president of a local union who distributed a circular protesting the appointment of a receiver was charged with circulating false and malicious statements, tried by the convention and expelled. The court held that the trial was void because no express provision gave the convention power to hear such charges, and none would be implied even though the convention was the supreme governing and judicial body of the union. In a contrasting case a gap was filled to uphold the fining of a bandleader who cut union scale and sold jobs. His acquittal by the local trial board was appealed to the international executive board, which reversed and fixed the penalty. The court held that although the constitution was silent, the power to convict and punish was inherent in the appellate power.40 In both of these cases the court could have as logically drawn the opposite inference from silence.41 Gaps in the constitutional provisions gave the courts an opportunity for choice. In so far as procedural provisions are detailed and specific, the court may invalidate discipline by requiring strict compliance, or uphold it by finding that the defects were unsubstantial or were waived. In Jose v. Savage 42 a member who accused the officers of misconduct was charged with slandering a union officer. The court held that the trial board had no jurisdiction because three of its eleven members had not been elected as required by the constitution, but had been appointed to fill vacancies occuring after the election. Such punctiliousness, however, is not always required. The expulsion of a local president who applied to a rival union for a charter did not need to follow the letter of the constitution; substantial compliance was enough. 43 
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Even the penalty provisions may give the courts room to regulate discipline by interpretation. In Scivoletti v. Leckie 4 members of the Bartenders Union who formed an opposition group within the union were charged with dual unionism, suspended for six months, and barred from holding union office for two years. After their suspension they asked for reinstatement of their seniority rights but were refused. This, the court said, was imposing an unauthorized penalty, for the constitution did not list loss of seniority as a penalty. The court thus found a violation of the constitution justifying judicial intervention and protection of the disciplined member.
These cases make clear that in discipline cases the contract theory, which verbally limits the courts to enforcing the union's own rules, in fact gives the court wide freedom. The union writes the constitution, but the court interprets it, and the interpretation process here is not confined by the customary limiting guides. The intent of the parties is unsought, even if discoverable; past practice is ignored or rejected; and prior court decisions interpreting similar clauses are not precedents. Within the broad range between a restrictive reading and an expansive interpretation, between literal conformity and substantial compliance, the court chooses, case by case. Its choice determines whether the discipline shall be allowed or enjoined.
One pattern of interpretation is discernable in discipline cases-a tendency toward a restrictive interpretation which limits discipline. In three-fourths of the interpretation cases the court chose a narrow construction to invalidate the discipline. This is not an articulate principle, although the analogy of discipline to criminal law might point in this direction; nor is the pattern uniform. Liberal interpretation was used to uphold discipline mainly in cases involving such offenses as stealing,46 fraud,47 dual unionism,48 cutting union scale,49 or membership in the Communist Party ;50 but in an equal number of cases the courts have applied restrictive interpretations even to such offenses.5' What seems to emerge, apart from other factors, is an unspoken judicial distaste for union discipline, and the courts' willingness to use interpretation to curb the union's power. 
Judicial Review of the Evidence
The courts frequently declare that they will not reweigh the evidence before the union tribunal, but will look only to see if there is some evidence to support the finding of guilt. This language, however, is often but an apologetic prelude to a full re-evaluation of the evidence, justified by a holding that the findings were "totally unsustained."52 Cases in which courts do not in fact re-evaluate the evidence are almost exclusively those in which there was some evidence that the disciplined members had Communist ties. Once convinced of a member's Communist taint, the courts refuse to inquire further into the union's findings.53 Close examination of all other cases, however, makes clear that the courts normally reweigh the evidence, substituting their own evaluation of the facts for that of the union tribunal.
In some cases the court may narrowly view evidence or even construe it away in order to find the charges not proven. In Fittipaldi v. Legassie,4 a member was charged with slandering a union officer in that during a dispute at a union meeting he said the president was a "G.D. Communist." When asked to repeat the statement, he said, "This is getting to be a communist outfit." At the union trial six witnesses stated, when asked, that they heard him say during a verbal altercation with the president that "this is getting to be a communist outfit." None was asked or testified about the other statement. The court held that the record "contains no evidence to substantiate the charge."55 In another case, members of a local which was in receivership defied orders by calling a meeting, adopting a constitution, and electing officers. The court found that this was really not a meeting or an election, but only an attempt by the local to dramatize its desire for selfgovernment. There was, therefore, no evidence of disobedience. 56 One of the difficulties of limiting judicial review to a determination of whether there is substantial evidence to support the union's findings is that frequently there is no adequate record of the union proceedings Study of the cases indicates that judges often go far beyond hearing evidence directly relevant to the charges, and in fact learn of the whole internal problem of which the discipline is but a part. For example, in Gleeson v. Conrad 69 members who were disciplined for violating an order to turn in their routebooks sought to show in court that they were members of the opposition group, what had been said by the president when he ordered them to turn in their books, and the political motivation of the order. The judge overruled the union's objection that this was irrelevant saying, "We might as well hear the whole story." In Cromwell v. Morrin 60 local officers were removed from office and barred from meetings for five years because the local called an unauthorized strike. The court hearing consisted largely of attempts by the local officers, on the one hand, to show that the international officers had "sold out" the local by agreeing to a "soft" contract; the international officers, on the other hand, sought to show that the local was controlled by Communists. The courts not only willingly hear such evidence, but it is generally accepted by almost all lawyers involved in these cases that evidence of the sources of the underlying dispute is influential, if not crucial, in the decisions of the courts.
The doctrinal structure, despite the superficial rigidity of the contract theory, is loose-jointed and flexible in the hands of the courts. The nature of discipline provisions, as well as the sensitive and vital interests involved, increase this flexibility, and the courts have used it freely to impose judicial regulation on union discipline. Within wide limits, it is not the union constitution but the court which controls. Recognition of this fact presents significant and difficult questions-What limits do the courts in fact impose on union discipline? What conduct can the unions punish? And what procedural safeguards must the union observe?
had been "curiously" destroyed; and in Tesoriero v. Miller, supra note 36, the International Executive Board had appointed a commission to investigate the appeal of an expulsion, but the commission's report misstated the facts and the appeal was denied.
58. Examination of the record in Madden v. Atkins, supra note 20, shows that the union trial minutes were hopelessly garbled and a substantial portion of the trial in the lower court was spent in trying to resolve conflicting testimony as to what evidence had been presented. 59. Supra note 28. The facts in this case, not contained in the reported opinion, are derived from the record on appeal.
60. Supra note 18. The facts in this case, not contained in the reported opinion, are derived from discussions with the principal participants.
Precise answers to these questions are impossible, for courts commonly cloak their reasons in doctrinal rationalizations. In addition, courts have concurrent concerns which may be mingled or confused. Procedural defects may be used to void discipline for conduct which the court thinks ought not be punished, or exhaustion may be required partly because the court believes the discipline is justified. On the other hand, objection to procedural defects may express a bona fide insistence on regularity and due process, and requiring exhaustion may reflect a real desire to give the union first chance to correct its own mistakes. Separating these elements and discerning a pattern is extremely difficult, involving much more intuitive judgment than statistical analysis. In addition, the pattern is at times torn by unperceptive and rulebound judges who never escape wooden doctrinal analysis.
C. PUNISHABLE OFFENSES
The most crucial inquiry in union discipline is determining what conduct the courts consider punishable, and what conduct they feel should be beyond the reach of union discipline. Although judges seldom declare explicitly that certain conduct can or can not be punished, their opinions often carry clues which betray their attitude toward the substantive offense. By going behind the opinion one can better see the whole internal dispute as the judge saw it, and can understand more clearly what factors may have influenced his decision. With over one hundred judicial opinions in discipline cases, and with careful study of the background and entire litigation of thirty-five of these cases, some patterns begin to emerge which suggest what activities of union members the courts will shield and what they will leave unprotected.
Offenses for which union members are punished fall largely into six rather distinct categories which reflect marked differences in judicial response to union discipline. We are concerned, not with the constitutional clause invoked, but with the conduct in fact punished, for it is clear that the judges go behind the charge to the conduct itself. Thus, in Madden v. Atkins 61 the court gave the protection it felt appropriate for internal political opposition, which was the root of the discipline, not dual unionism, for which they were charged. Determining the conduct that is in fact being punished is not always this simple. For example, in Gleeson v. Conrad,62 though the overt offense was violating an officer's order, the court may have seen in this discipline the persecution of political opponents; and in Cromwell v. Morrin 63 the offense given weight by the court may have been either the unauthorized-strike or the alleged Communist activity. Although this makes precise definition of punishable offenses impossible, the cumulative effect of the cases is to provide some helpful guides and to indicate the relative degree of judicial approval or disapproval of the various categories of offenses. 
Financial Offenses
The courts have freely affirmed the union's power to enforce the payment of dues and assessments, even to the extent of not using the power of interpretation to prevent the forfeiting of substantial death benefits for minor delinquencies in dues.64 In contrast with other offenses, the delinquent member can be summarily suspended without notice or hearing, although a subsequent procedure may be required to enable him to show that he was not delinquent or that the dues were not assessed in accordance with the constitution.65
This favorable judicial attitude toward enforcing financial obligations does not, however, prevent the courts from looking behind a union's nominal action to see if strict enforcement of these obligations is being used as a device to eliminate disliked individuals.66 Whether the New York courts would go an additional step of reflecting in their decisions in discipline cases their attitudes toward the purpose for which union funds were used is not indicated by the cases.
Discipline 
Use of the Courts
Many unions have explicit clauses punishing resort to the courts without first exhausting internal appeals, and others will in fact punish such resort under less specific provisions. The legality of such discipline has never been squarely decided in New York, but the cases indicate a judicial hostility to such interference with access to the courts. In Polin v. Kaplan 86 the Court of Appeals ordered reinstatement and damages for a member who was disciplined for suing to recover funds allegedly misappropriated by the union. The court not only warped the constitution to find no violation of an explicit clause, but also said that this was not disloyalty, injurious to the union, or tending to disruption. It then declared :87
It was the absolute right of the plaintiffs to bring the suit, whether they could successfully maintain it or not, and they might not be expelled for having so done.
In Angrisani v. Stearn 88 two brothers were expelled on charges of carrying on union business out of meeting, one because he sued to enjoin an assessment he claimed illegal, and the other because he agreed to testify in the suit if subpoenaed. The court reinstated both, stating that there was a right to bring the suit even though it could not be sustained, and an even clearer right to obey a subpoena.
The courts, however, have not uniformly given vigorous protection in this area.89 One court has suggested that the right to use the courts does not extend to assisting another financially to bring suit against the union." In some cases the courts have denied relief because appeals from the discipline have not been exhausted,9' or have apparently felt that there were other grounds which more than justified the union's action.92
Some unions provide a more limited penalty: assessing against the member, if he loses, costs incurred by the union in defending the suit. In Roman v. Caputo 93 a member who brought a suit that was almost totally devoid of substance was assessed $714. When he sought temporary injunction against this assessment the union justified its action on the grounds that the suit was part of a deliberate plan of harassment by a left wing faction to paralyze the union. The court denied the injunction for failure to exhaust internal remedies, thus avoiding both the factual and substantive issues.94
Political Activity Within the Union
A large proportion of the litigated discipline cases have at their roots a factional fight within the union, and in many it is reasonably apparent that the discipline is directed toward curbing criticism and political opposition. The contract theory, woodenly followed, gives no protection against such discipline, for union constitutions commonly contain provisions circumscribing political activity in the union. They may prohibit "slandering an officer," "circulating leaflets without permission," "forming groups or clubs within the union," or "carrying on union business outside of meeting." Even without such clauses, political opposition may be charged with "creating dissension," "causing disruption," "bringing the union into disrepute," or "conduct detrimental to the best interests of the union."
The courts, however, have not proven themselves so wooden. Although they did not, prior to Madden v. Atkins,95 explicitly declare that freedom of speech and assembly within the union could not be impaired by union discipline, they freely manipulated the flexible doctrines to achieve that end.96 Polin v. Kaplan 97 is itself a classic example. While restating the contract theory and studiously avoiding any holding that free criticism was beyond the reach of union discipline, the court shriveled constitutional provisions, ignored significant portions of the charges, and refused to accept the union's findings of fact, all to the end of protecting those who dared to exercise their democratic rights. Out of forty litigated cases discernably involving discipline for internal political activity, the courts have voided the discipline in all but ten cases. Inarticulate the courts have been, insensitive they have not.
Courts' ability to protect freedom of speech and assembly by indirection is aided by the tendency of political cases to breed procedural defects.98 Arrogant officers who crush opposition are often not scrupulous in obeying the constitution or sensitive to the standards of procedural due process,99 and political criticism may goad thin-skinned leaders to rash action.100 Thus, when a union member mounted a soap box and declared that the union was rotten to the core, that the leaders were a lot of labor fakers, and that the president was the worst dog in the heap, he was expelled without notice and hearing.101 Such defects were particularly prevalent in the past when lawyers were not so heavily leaned on to avoid pitfalls and to provide the form of fairness.102 Political discipline is particularly vulnerable to the fatal flaw of bias, for unions lack any independent judiciary, and trial bodies are politically oriented. If the trial is before the executive board, the court can find that it includes those criticized;103 if it is before an elected committee, the court may find it controlled by one of the factions ;104 if it is before the local meeting, the court may find the vote motivated by partisan politics ;105 and even if it is chosen by lot, the court may find traces of bias.106 Even though the union avoids substantial procedural defects, the courts have demonstrated marked ability to find technical violations of the constitution 107 or hidden weaknesses in the evidence.108 Even the union's best efforts will fail. In Shapiro v. Gehiman 109 a union member who accused officers of mishandling union funds was charged with slandering officers. The constitution required a trial before the executive committee, but because this would have included the officers whom he had accused, a special trial committee was named. The court declared that that violated the constitution and ordered him reinstated. In a later case the same court held that where a member was tried by an executive committee which included officers whom he had accused of misconduct, the proceedings were void for bias.1"0 counsel, a lawyer may be admitted to membership so as to make him available for this purpose, , the meeting at which the trial committee was elected was so confused that the court could not determine who was nominated or in what order. Of the seven who were elected, three were paid employees of the union who owed their jobs to the officers who had been bitterly criticized by the accused, and a fourth was one who signed and prosecuted charges against other members of the opposition for the same activity. This created "grave doubts" as to the impartiality of the committee and was enough to invalidate the discipline. With the decision in Madden v. Atkins " it is no longer necessary for courts to use such devices, for the Court of Appeals has forcefully declared as public policy that "traditionally democratic means of improving their union may be freely availed of by members without fear of harm or penalty."112 This does not mean that the courts will cease using procedural or other discoverable defects to cloak protection of democratic rights, for they may prefer to use these more mechanical rationalizations. However, explicit statement of this limit on union discipline will make judges more consciously aware of their responsibility for safeguarding these basic rights, and give them a firmer hand in providing protection.
The articulate recognition of these rights requires the courts to face squarely what conduct falls within the broad term "traditionally democratic means of improving their union." The opinion in Madden v. Atkins went no further then to say that "this necessarily includes the right to criticize current union leadership and, within the union, to oppose such leadership and its policies."'1,3 This, however, will not solve the hard problems raised by the wide range of conduct in political activity cases. An examination of the facts before the Madden court suggests some of those problems, and gives more specific content to the court's decision.
The conduct for which Madden and his supporters were expelled was neither mild nor well-mannered. They brought suit to block an election and threatened President Atkins that if he resisted the suit they would publish leaflets attacking him. When the suit and threats failed, members of the election committee who supported Madden refused to proceed with the election and had to be replaced. Discipline for this "violating his obligation as a member" was not discussed by the court; but this conduct was in fact protected as a part of the whole political conflict. The "smear sheets" distributed during the campaign accused Atkins of having been a Communist, obtaining his license by fraud, stealing union funds, selling jobs, and rigging elections. This was characterized by the Appellate Division as "fair comment" to which "union officials, by offering themselves as candidates . . . subject themselves."
Although its text was strong and even defamatory, that is not abnormal in such struggles for power in a membership organization, especially a trade union. If an opposition slate of candidates is not to be granted a reasonably free hand there would be little chance to bring corruption to [Vol.70:175 and issued a periodical criticizing the officers and their handling of union affairs. The charges of holding "unauthorized meetings" and allowing strangers to attend and discuss union matters were swept aside, and the organizing of such an opposition group considered a "traditionally democratic means of improving the union.""5
The words of the court, when viewed against the facts before it, suggest at least two significant guides. First, the protection of democratic rights is very broad, including a wide latitude for fair comment,"16 full freedom for organized opposition,"7 and for an extending of the debate beyond the confines of the union meeting and membership. These rights prevail even though their exercise may cause disunity and temporary disruption. Second, the court will not uphold discipline because a union member in the heat of union meetings or a political contest overstepped the bounds in some relatively minor respect."18 Courts will look to the total context to determine whether the impact of the discipline is to repress legitimate political debate. These are not new with Madden v. Atkins; this case only makes more explicit the guides which the New York courts have in fact followed. were swept aside; claims that the trial was before the wrong union tribunal were resolved by accepting the union's interpretation of the constitution; and allegations of double jeopardy were ignored. Other leaders of the left-wing faction fared no better. French, the business agent of one local, was charged with improperly permitting the use of spray guns and barred from all union activities for three years. His suit for reinstatement, based on claims that his trial violated the union constitution in a number of respects and also denied due process, was dismissed for his failure to exhaust union remedies.124 He then completed his internal appeals, and renewed his suit, only to have it dismissed on the grounds that the first decision was res adjudicate !125 Davis, secretary of another local, was charged with slander because of statements he had made in opposing a referendum for a dues increase, tried by a board which included those allegedly slandered, found guilty, and barred from union activities for five years. His request for a temporary injunction was denied because he failed "to establish a clear right to relief."'26 By the time the case was called for trial a year later,'27 it was moot because he had been expelled as a Communist Party member.'28 Fritsch, another opposition leader, brought suit to invalidate a referendum, but relief was denied because of laches.129 The union then assessed the costs of the suit, over $200, against Fritsch, and when he moved to have the court order amended to prevent this, the motion was denied.130 Later, when another member of the opposition challenged a referendum and lost,13' he too was assessed costs by the union. A temporary injunction was denied.'32 By the time the case was called for trial a year and a half later the plaintiff had come to terms with the union. 188 In none of these cases, except Weinstock v. Ladisky, was the communist issue reflected in the opinions, but it was constantly raised by counsel and was a strong undercurrent in all of the affidavits and arguments.
Communist Activities
The judicial response to such pleas is suggested by less reticent opinions. In Ames v. Dubinsky 134 seven left-wing candidates for local office distributed leaflets accusing the incumbent officers and their "administration" or "clique" of red-baiting, persecuting the leaders of the rank and file, rigging the election, and running a profit-making testimonial dinner. Although vitriolic and potentially defamatory, the leaflets, with their communist jargon and abusive epithets, were pallid political commentary compared to the leaflets distributed by Madden and his friends. Ames and others were accused of slandering union officers, tried before the executive board, and found guilty. This was ratified by the local, and they were barred from all union activities for five years. The court, after a fervent though not judicially restrained parading of the evils of communism, insisted that the issue of communism was of "minor importance," except that the leaflets were "quite an exhibition of communist double talk." The executive board was found to be unbiased because it did not include the officers who brought the charges, and there was no evidence of probative value to show domination. The "factual question" of the truth or falsity of the leaflets and whether they came within the protection of fair comment "must be regarded as being within the exclusive province of the tribunal . . . free from review by . . . any public court."135 Not even clear proof of Communist Party membership is required to create a judicial unwillingness to intervene. In Dakchoylous v. Ernst 136 a local business agent who had opposed the international officers in the last convention was removed from office and suspended from membership on charges of "associating with communists." He claimed that the charges were politically motivated and that his signature on a Communist Party card was either a forgery or obtained by trickery. The court said that since there was "some evidence" to support the union's finding, the court could not substitute its judgment of sufficiency; and even though he signed unwittingly, this did not mitigate the injury to the local and its members.
Summary
Courts' responses to union discipline vary markedly, depending on the conduct for which punishment is imposed. Strict enforcement of financial obligations and close regulation of conduct directly related to ele union's collective bargaining function are unhesitatingly upheld, and duel unionism gains little judicial sympathy. These matters courts view as clearly within the bounds of union discipline, and policy, as well as doctrinal logic, presses courts to leave to the unions the power to regulate their own affairs. Courts, however, penetrate the veil of nominal charges and search out the sources of the underlying dispute. If they discover that discipline is disguised political repression, or is being used for some other questionable purpose, their tolerance disappears.
Restrictions on the member's access to the courts, whether directly by discipline, or indirectly by assessing the costs of suit, are of a drastically different order. The courts do not look kindly on such private efforts to bar their doors.137 Although the courts may turn away a member who has come prematurely or with a worthless case, they do not leave him unprotected from being lashed by the union for his mistake.
The conduct which has in fact received the broadest judicial protection is the exercise of democratic rights within the union. The courts have envisioned unions as democratic institutions, and though seldom articulate, have bent the theories, case by case, to place freedom of speech and assembly beyond the reach of union discipline. This basic pattern, long obscured by conradicting language which may have deceived even the judges who used it, is now made explicit by Madden v. Atkins. '38 In direct contrast, engaging in communist activities is not only unprotected, but the very taint may lead to outlawry. This judicial policy seems to prevail over all others. As the Painters' cases 139 and Ames v. Dubinsky 140 suggest, the right to criticize union officers suddenly shrivels when exercised by communists; and opposition groups tainted with communism may find themselves impaled on sharp points of the contract theory or the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. It is significant that even due process is less due when claimed by communists. Of the ten cases in which the courts failed to protect members disciplined for political activity, five involved alleged communists.
It is evident that in confronting discipline cases courts are caught in crosscurrents of varying force which make any simple analysis impossible. In Cromwell v. Morrin 141 officers of the local were disciplined for calling an authorized strike. They claimed that the international officers were being paid off to make a soft contract; and the international in turn claimed that the local was controlled by communists. The court's response to the union's limitation on striking and the charge of communism could understandably outweight its response to the charge of corruption.
Even the weight to be given to a particular value can vary according to the court's feeling for its importance in the case. For example, the business agent of a local union in Buffalo was removed from office and barred from union meetings for five years because he had made expenditures without formal authorization. He claimed that he was tried without notice of any charges, and also hinted that the discipline was for political reasons. The court dismissed his suit for failure to exhaust his internal remedies.142 He then pursued his internal appeals, including an appeal to the Ethical Practices Committee, 137. It should be noted that the cases in which the court seemed reluctant to give full protection to the right to sue or otherwise resort to legal process were ones in which the disciplined individual was part of a left-wing faction or was accused of corruption and racketeering. See notes 92-94 supra. [Vol.70:175 graphically describing his grievances at length. It merely referred his complaint to the international union, and shortly thereafter he was charged with "revealing union business to unauthorized persons, namely, submitting the complaint to the Ethical Practices Committee." When he was ordered to stand trial before the international officers in Washington, the same court which had earlier dismissed his suit now enjoined the union from even holding the trial.143 The case was no longer predominantly a financial case, but was now predominantly one involving political rights; judicial neutrality was replaced by unhesitating judicial protection.
D. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
In over two-thirds of the cases in which courts grant relief against discipline they find some flaw in the union's trial procedure. The New York courts are willing, if not anxious, to use procedural regularity as the ostensible area of review, for this is an area in which union constitutions provide more specific guides and in which the courts feel more familiar. Moreover, procedural defects, real or imagined, provide convenient pegs on which to hang decisions without openly regulating disciplinary offenses. It is therefore difficult to define with precision the procedural standards actually imposed, independent of the offense involved.
The most elementary articulate rule is that the union must comply with the procedure prescribed by its own constitution. shown.149 This does not mean that the court's function is purely mechanical, for it may interpret the procedural provisions, treat deviations as insubstantial, or find a waiver of the defect. There is no pattern of strictness or liberality in enforcing the constitution, for the procedural provisions are manipulated by the courts to achieve substantive results. As has already been suggested, the deviation tolerated depends largely on the judicial tolerance of the offense punished.
Compliance with the constitution, however, is not enough; the procedure must provide the rudimentary elements of fairness. The courts early escaped the inhibiting bounds of the contract theory to declare explicitly that "in the absence of precise stipulation for notice . . . and hearing . . . public policy demands that the law intervene to supply such omission."150 Consistently, and without apology or disguise, the courts have imposed a standard of fairness or "natural justice" until it has now become a fundamental principle of near-constitutional quality. In the words of a recent opinion, "the main question in this lawsuit is due process of law, which, under the Constitution of the United States, is supreme, notwithstanding the constitutions or rules of labor unions."151
This leaves unanswered the critical question: what minimum standards of fairness are imposed by the courts wholly apart from the procedural provisions of union constitutions. The freighted phrases bespeak a strong judicial concern, and suggest a standard akin to that imposed by due process on administrative tribunals. Although formal legal procedure is not required, and adaptations must be made for union structures, the judges look not to union practices and traditions but to the courts' own traditional notions of the essential elements of a fair hearing.
Precise definition of the various elements of fairness is difficult, for the central concern of the court is whether the procedure as a whole is substantially fair. The court may sense general unfairness, causing it uncritically to condemn every step in the procedure,152 or it may isolate and define particular defects. In spite of this, a pattern is discernible from which it is possible to identify the essential elements of fairness.
1. Summary Procedure. Inflicting punishment without any notice or hearing will not be tolerated by the courts,158 regardless of the seriousness of the Nor will explicit provisions in the union constitution for such "drum head courts martial" make them any more acceptable.157 Such crude measures now seldom come before the courts, for as soon as they are challenged corrective measures are taken by the union to provide at least the form of fairness. A more difficult problem is whether the union can take summary action to suspend and then provide a subsequent hearing. In discipline cases, in contrast to other union proceedings such as removal of an officer or imposition of a trusteeship, courts have been hostile to any such procedure.158 There is normally no need for immediate action, as continued membership creates no pressing danger to the union and declarations of guilt can wait upon due process.
2. Notice of Charges. The accused is entitled to notice of the time and place of the hearing and to know the charges against him.159 The courts have not specified the form or time of serving notice, required the charges to be in writing or signed, nor objected to the evidence varying from the charge, so long as there is no surprise or prejudice.160 They have looked not to the form but to the substance to determine whether the accused had an adequate opportunity to prepare his defense. In some of these respects the standard imposed by the courts is less exacting than that required by many union constitutions. 8. Double Jeopardy. The rule against double jeopardy has been broadly stated in Lafferty v. Fremd, "it is generally unjust to require a duly acquitted man to defend himself a second time, and generally contrary to sound public policy to permit the reopening of matters once judicially determined . . . unless there be some special circumstances making a second trial both necessary and just."'188 The rule as stated is not the rigid one applicable to criminal proceedings, but is made flexible by the loosely worded exception. This flexibility is suggested in Weinstock v. Ladisky,189 in which a member was expelled for being a communist. He admitted the fact, but among other defenses claimed double jeopardy in that he had been tried on the same charge several years before and had been acquitted. The court, which did not even dignify this argument with an answer, was fully aware that at the time of his prior acquittal the trial board was controlled by the communist faction. This, along with the continuing nature of the offense, might well have made the court feel that "a second trial was both necessary and just."
Right of Counsel. Most unions permit a member on trial to choose counsel
In practical terms, the more important question is whether acquittal by the trial body can be appealed within the union, for many union constitutions allow such appeals and even empower the appeal body to find the accused guilty.190 To order a new trial because of procedural errors or mistakes of law might not shock the sense of justice, but for an appeal body to reverse an acquittal and find guilt would not only cut to the very heart of double jeopardy; it would also raise serious problems of fair hearings. The latter problem is particularly acute because the appellate tribunal frequently has nothing but an incomplete and unreliable record of the hearing before the trial board.19' 9. Summary. It can be fairly said that in most respects courts closely scrutinize union disciplinary proceedings to protect against procedural unfairness. Although the strictness of the standard may vary some, depending on the nature of the offense and the obviousness of guilt, the variance is probably not greater than that practiced in criminal cases in the same courts. The weakest point in discipline proceedings, the inherent bias of union tribunals in cases arising out of factional disputes, is the weakest point in judicial protection. This is not because of the court's indifference or naivete, but rather because the political pressures may be so submerged or indirect as to defy proof in court. In spite of this, most judges sense the dangers and often make some rough compensation for that which they feel but can not find. 
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The doctrinal declaration that courts will not intervene in internal union disputes until all appeals within the union have been exhausted has, in theory, three underlying policies. First, union appellate tribunals may take corrective action, thus reducing the burden on the courts. Second, the benefit of the expert judgment of these tribunals might aid courts in making more responsible decisions. Third, the deep and pervading principle of preserving the autonomy of unions constrains courts to give the union full responsibility and opportunity to correct its own mistakes. Against these policies is balanced the policy of providing reasonably prompt and effective judicial protection to important legal rights.
The discipline cases present a complex pattern of adherence and rejection of these policies. From the general rule the courts have carved various exceptions, some which reflect the underlying policies and some which seem to ignore them and effectively repudiate the rule. 194. In all of these cases further appeals were available beyond the step the court termed futile, either to the international president, the international executive board, or to the convention. The courts have not required the plaintiff to show that these further steps were futile or should be excused on some other ground. Delay of Appeals. The policy of prompt protection of rights may outweigh the other policies if the time required for internal appeals is too long, but the courts do no explicit balancing. In expulsion cases delays of one year or more have been held to be too long,199 but in suspension cases an appeal available only after the suspension has expired, and the member has been reinstated, may be considered too late.200 In Browne v. Hibbets20' the failure of an appeal tribunal to give an answer for one month was held to justify judicial intervention. 202 In most of the cases in which the court relied on the element of delay, the disciplined member was apparently barred from his job. In one he was suspended from his position as paid business agent,203 and in another the delay in internal appeals would have caused him to forfeit the insurance which he had acquired as a part of his membership.24 It is doubtful, however, whether courts give special weight to these economic factors as compared with the injury sustained by a disciplined member who is deprived of his right to participate in the union or to run for union office during a protracted appeal. 205 
Exceptions to the
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Void Proceedings. An all-consuming exception to the exhaustion doctrine has been succinctly stated in the leading case of Tesoriero v. Miller :26 It is well settled that if the action of the union is without jurisdiction, or is without notice or authority or not in compliance with the rules or constitutional provisions, or is void for any reason, the obligation to appeal within the union is not imposed, but the complaining member may resort directly to the courts.207
This exception has in fact been as broadly applied as is here stated. Proceedings have been found void because they have denied due process for lack of notice or hearing,208 for bias of the tribunal, 9 or for holding the hearing at a distance.210 Any failure to comply with the constitution may likewise cause courts to find voidness. Thus, exhaustion has been excused because the offense charged was not prohibited by the constitution,21' the notice was defective as to form,212 the trial body was improperly constituted,218 or suspension for failure to appear at a hearing was not authorized by the constitution214
This exception has been used even to enjoin the union from holding a trial in the first instance when the defect is clear.215 Thus courts have enjoined unions from proceeding with hearings where they were to be held in a distant city,216 before an improperly named tribunal,217 without an equal right of counsel,218 or in violation of the right against double jeopardy.219 weight when exhaustion is excused because of delay. The cases in which exhaustion is required also contain many in which the member was barred from his job or suffered other economic injury.
It is apparent that this exception is capable of completely swallowing the rule, for it is applicable to every case in which the disciplined member has a meritorious claim. Contrary to the other exceptions, it has no visible roots in any of the policies underlying the rule, but under the thin verbal disguise of "no jurisdiction" and "void" it repudiates the rule and its policies. This exception, like other exceptions, is not consistently applied, but it is used frequently and is always available for courts to use when they feel the need to grant relief.
Adherence to the Rule
These multiple exceptions have obviously removed the requirement of exhaustion as an insuperable obstacle to judicial intervention. Systematic study of the cases shows that by applying the exceptions courts have sapped the rule of almost all vitality except in random cases. Out of more than 100 discipline cases, the rule has been applied in 20, but even this may exaggerate its importance. In seven of those cases, the court's opinion makes clear on its face that the plaintiff's case had no merit or was procedurally defective, and that failure to exhaust was added only as a makeweight.220 In six, suit was brought even before the union trial body had made a decision, and in none of these was there any clear error shown in the proceedings.221 The remaining seven cases might be considered common-place enforcement applications of the rule, but they are not all of one piece. For example, in one the court's responsibility was lightened by the fact that the expelled members were given full membership in the union, including the right to run for office, pending the internal appeals ;222 in another case the judge woodenly refused to excuse a failure to exhaust even though the appeal was to a tribunal which included the officers he had accused of misuse of funds ;223 and in still another the doctrine was so manipulated as to totally frustrate the leader of a left-wing faction from getting any judicial review of his expulsion, even after he had exhausted his internal appeals. This scattered application of the rule is in sharp contrast to the thirty-six discipline cases in which courts expressly applied one or more exceptions to excuse exhaustion. Moreover, in more than thirty cases courts made no mention of exhaustion, and study of the court files indicates that this judicial silence sometimes conceals the court's deliberate overlooking of failure to exhaust.
Courts' demonstrated willingness to excuse exhaustion while giving lip service to the rule may seem incongruous, for the rule is based on policies which should be expected to carry special weight with' the courts-policies which involve the work load of courts, the need for expert guidance, and the desire to preserve union autonomy. The' most plausible explanation is that courts have little real confidence in union appeal procedures. Appellate tribunals are, like trial tribunals, part of the union's political structure, and litigated discipline cases are so often facets of a factional fight which have implications beyond the particular local that the courts distrust the handling of such appeals. The frequent inadequacy or unreliability of the trial record makes responsible review on appeal nearly impossible, and the decisions of the appellate body are totally unilluminating to the court. To all of this is added the courts' common impression, gained from the cases themselves, that union appeals are shunted about through unnecessarily numerous steps, finally terminating in some remote convention. All of these factors feed the judges' suspicions that when the union pleads failure to exhaust internal appeals, it seeks not an opportunity to correct errors, but an opportunity to exhaust the disciplined member. Once this suspicion is entertained, consciously or unconsciously, the policies underlying the rule are nullified and policies pressing for immediate intervention prevail. [Vol. 70:175 or participate in the second trial and was again found guilty. In the absence of any clear showing of unfairness in the second trial, or efforts by the plaintiff to appeal within the union, the court refused to give further protection.226 The significant point is that the court escaped the dilemma of either superseding the union's appellate procedures or leaving the member wholly unprotected during protracted appeals. It did this by the simple device of protecting his membership rights pending internal appeals conditioned on his reasonable pursuit of those appeals. The responsibility for taking corrective action was left on the union, and the incentive was placed on the union not to delay, but to expedite, appeals. The court, in turn, because it gave only interim relief, did not need to make the close inquiry required for making the ultimate decision. The member was, in the meantime, given full protection.227
C. Protection Within the
The device of staying execution of the union's action pending internal appeals was first used by the Cardozo Court,228 but has been overlooked by subsequent courts: The single exception was in the Shernoff v. Schimel case.229
In spite of the lack of confidence which courts have manifested in union appellate procedures, unions' tribunals should not be denied the opportunity to prove themselves, particularly when this can be so easily allowed without any substantial loss of protection to the individual.280
F. EFFECTIVENESS OF JUDICIAL REMEDIES
Judicial protection against oppressive union discipline is meaningful only to the extent that effective remedies are practically available. Measuring the effectiveness of remedies in practical terms requires close scrutiny of at least three factors: first, the forms of remedies available; second, the delay involved in obtaining judicial protection; and third, the costs of litigation. The ultimate concern is the impact of the judicial action on the democratic processes of the unions. Little understanding of the effectiveness of remedies can be gained from the published opinions, and self-evident assumptions often prove empty upon closer scrutiny of the litigation. The material here is based largely on a detailed study of court files and interviews with lawyers who handled these cases. 230. Such an order would handicap the union in effecting an immediate ouster of those found unfit, but the delay will be only that produced by the union's own appellate proceedings. In special cases the court could tailor the interim order to balance the interests of the union and the disciplined member.
Forms of Remedies
Suits for wrongful discipline are almost always equitable proceedings seeking two remedies-reinstatement in the union and damages.23' Proceedings in the nature of mandamus 232 have fared badly,233 are generally unfamiliar to lawyers, and offer no advantages. Even though the disciplined member has no desire for reinstatement, but only for damages, such equitable relief as reinstatement may be sought as a method of avoiding the delays which are commonly involved in obtaining a jury trial.234
Reinstatement
If the court finds the discipline wrongful it orders full reinstatement to membership rights, and this is enforceable with the full panoply of equitable powers, including contempt.235 Circumvention by concocting new charges for some other offense will not hoodwink judges who customarily in these cases look behind the form to the substance,236 and there is no evidence that such devices are often attempted. On the contrary, even though the discipline is voided for procedural reasons and the union might retry the member, such action is seldom taken. In almost every case the order of reinstatement is in fact final.237
Judicial orders can not restore a member to full union fellowship, and reinstatement may be blighted by traditional union hostility to courts. In practice, however, this seems to be less important than might be at first imagined. In some unions, such as the National Maritime Union, resort to the courts has become an accepted part of internal union disputes. Moreover, the fact that the litigated case is commonly championed by one political group within the Where it is brought about by action on the part of the membership, at a meeting or otherwise, in accordance with the union constitution, the act of expulsion will be regarded as the act of the union for which damages may be recovered from union funds. Where, however, proof of such union action is lacking, the claim for damages against the organization must fail.247
The verbal formula of the court seems to be that where the constitution delegates the power of expulsion to a trial committee or a regular meeting, every member, by joining the union, authorizes the action and thereby subjects the funds of the union to liability for abuse of that power.
The language of delegation rationalizes judicial undermining of the anachronistic rule which gave unincorporated associations almost total immunity from tort and contract liability. However, it provides no useful test of the limits of liability for it can be manipulated to deny liability entirely. Thus, if the offense charged were not provided in the constitution, or if the notice did not conform to the constitutional requirements, the union might argue that no authority had been delegated by the members to try that case, and that therefore no liability could be found. If the trial body were improperly constituted (a common defect) a court might hold that there was no delegation whatsoever to that body and deny damages.248 248. In such cases, the courts often declare that the trial body had "no valid existence" and that the proceedings are "totally void." This language is used to justify excusing exhaustion, but having used such language to find that the plaintiff had a cause of action, the court would make transparent its dissembling metaphor to find "delegation. The amount of damages is usually based on the loss of earnings due to the discipline, including loss of fringe items such as health and welfare benefits and pension rights.252 Calculating these may be complicated, but creates no serious stumbling block.253 However, if the discipline results in a loss of seniority rights, the problem of measuring damages is not one of mathematics but of fortune telling, and courts can at best make informed guesses. Presumably, added damages might be awarded for emotional distress caused by the discipline, but this seems never to be sought.
The amount recovered in these cases can be substantial if several members have been disciplined and the proceedings are prolonged. In two cases, the damages awarded were more than $3,000,254 and one case was settled for $8,000. Far overshadowing all others is Madden v. Atkins, in which five members were awarded a total of nearly $250,000 against the local union.255 Judgments against the local union, even large ones, are normally collectible, for local treasuries have usually proven to be adequate.250
The damage remedy helps supplement the remedy of reinstatement, but its practical value is subject to substantial discount. First, since the enactment of sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) of Taft-Hartley, unions have tended to avoid infringing on the disciplined member's employment opportunities in any provable fashion.257 Second, the awarding of damages tends to make settlement more difficult and protracts litigation, for the slate can not be wiped clean by restoring the man to membership. In Madden v. Atkins the litigation over damages continued for more than two years, with a multitude of motions, hearings, and appeals after the decision on the merits. Third, and probably most important, there are serious political obstacles to collecting damages. Union members tend to accept in good grace judicial orders of reinstatement, but they rebel against any attempt to appropriate a part of their dues money. The one who collects damages finds himself politically discredited.258 Investigation has shown that only in exceptional cases are the damages in fact collected, for the reinstated member does not wish to risk this ostracism.259 Because of these limitations on the damage remedy, it is apparent that damages are no substitute for prompt reinstatement in the union. 
Delay in Legal Relief
The effectiveness of legal remedies depends almost entirely on the promptness with which reinstatement is achieved. The test is not the time required to get a final adjudication on appeal, but the time required to obtain an order of reinstatement. Long delays in litgation impose little hardship if the members' rights are protected in the interim. The critical stage, therefore, is not the appeal but the motion for a temporary injunction.
Courts can and do give temporary injunctions protecting disciplined members' rights pending trial of the issues, and such relief can be given with whatever speed the situation demands.260 In one recent case a temporary injunction was issued in time to block a hearing scheduled to be held in a distant city,261 and in two other recent cases ex parte restraining orders were granted to interrupt hearings already begun.262 Although obtaining a temporary injunction after discipline has been imposed takes somewhat longer, study of court files reveals that such motions are usually decided in less than two months from the time the plaintiff brings suit.
Courts do not always issue temporary injunctions to protect the disciplined members pending trial. Their refusal is excused with obscuring language that "the facts are in dispute," or that there is "no clear showing of a right to relief," which is indeed true, just as it is in those cases in which they do grant temporary injunctions. Close study of the cases leads to the conclusion that when interim relief is denied, it is not because the particular remedy is inappropriate, but because the court is not convinced of the substantive merits of the plaintiff's case.263 The judges weigh the conflicting affidavits, hear the oral argument, and try to judge the underlying merits. The standard applied is substantially the same as that used for granting permanent injunctions. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that almost invariably the result after trial is the same as that on the motion for temporary injunction.264
Experience would suggest that courts should err on the side of liberality in granting temporary injunctions in discipline cases. Interim protection of the disciplined member normally places no substantial hardship on the union, for it only delays the impact of the penalty; but lack of protection may seriously injure the member, depriving him of his rights of participation in the democratic process in the union or even his livelihood. Madden v. Atkins 265 dramatically demonstrates the danger not only to the individual, but also to the union and to the courts themselves of the denial of interim relief. The leaders of the opposition party were expelled in the spring of 1953, and after some futile efforts to appeal moved for a temporary injunction in October, 1953. This was denied one month later, and the denial was affirmed in January, 1954, three months after the suit was begun. Obtaining a decision after trial, again unfavorable, took 18 more months, and the plaintiffs who had been out of work for two years were faced with raising money to print the voluminous record for appeal. This caused additional delay, and it was not until May, 1957, that a reversal was obtained in the appellate division and they were ordered reinstated. During the four intervening years the opposition group in the union was strangled and the ruling clique held unchallenged control. In addition, the union was saddled with a monumental financial liability, and the courts were burdened for two more years with a multiplicity of complex proceedings to determine the amount of the damages and to collect them. Hindsight makes doubly clear that the interests of both parties and the interests of the court would have been served by granting a temporary injunction at the outset.266 A plaintiff's temptation to abuse this remedy by deliberate delay in pressing his suit can be curbed by the court's continuing power to revoke the injunction.
In over half of the cases the plaintiff does not even seek interim relief, and relief is then necessarily postponed until after trial.267 The very failure to seek a temporary injunction removes the badge of urgency, obtaining preference for trial becomes more difficult, and the court feels no need for speed. reason for failure to seek interim relief is not clear, but apparently many lawyers are so misled by judicial language as to the extraordinary character of such relief that they mistakenly consider the request futile.
Complete litigation of these cases is time consuming, but exceptional cases such as Madden v. Atkins create an exaggerated impression of delay. In half of the discipline cases studied, the last legal step, including appeals, was completed within six months of the commencement of the suit. Less than onefourth took more than two years.
Some instances of delay seem inexcusable. One judge delayed five months, and another seven, in deciding motions for temporary injunctions,269 although many such motions are disposed of in a matter of days. In several cases, appeals to the appellate division took from one to two years, while some were handled in less than six months. Responsibility for delay does not rest solely on the courts or on the union lawyer's use of dilatory tactics. A substantial portion rests on the disciplined member and his lawyer. In one case the plaintiff seemed hesitant to go to trial for two years,270 and in another the plaintiff's lawyer refused to move for trial, causing a three year delay before he was removed.27' The fact that litigation is often used as a political instrument in a factional fight may lead to delaying tactics, first by one side and then the other, to get the maximum political advantage.
Study of the cases suggests that delay in judicial proceedings is not an insuperable obstacle to effective legal remedies. By giving interim relief courts can and do give the disciplined member substantial protection against the inevitable slowness of litigation. Furthermore, the equitable proceedings through which these cases are handled normally move relatively rapidly through the courts, even in those areas where delays in jury trials are notorious.
Costs of Litigation
The danger that the legal rights of a disciplined member will go by default because of the cost of asserting them in court is obvious, but the source and size of that danger is not so apparent. This study, including interviews with lawyers, indicates that the problem of costs is predominantly one of the isolated individual. Yet, if there is an active opposition group within the union, even he may gain protection, for any substantial injustice will be seized by the opposition as political ammunition. The group then provides the financial base for carrying through the litigation. The very fact that so few cases involve individuals unsupported by factional groups suggests that the lone member's rights go by default, and many lawyers frankly admitted that they would not take a case unless it was backed by a substantial group.276
The extent to which individuals and small groups have been able to enforce their rights in court is a tribute to those lawyers who, fired by a sense of injustice, have contributed unlimited time and energy with no anticipation of even meagre compensation. The burden falls heavily on the lawyer who fulfills his professional responsibility, but even that sacrifice is often inadequate.
CONCLUSION
Judicial doctrines do not decide concrete discipline cases-this is apparent from the face of the published opinions. The contract theory which purports to confine the court to applying the union constitution is at most a rough guide, for ambiguous and incomplete discipline provisions leave courts free to draw their own boundaries. The exhaustion of remedies rule, disarmed by multiple exceptions, is little more than an admonition against judicial haste. The threadbare cloak of language in the opinions cannot conceal that these doctrines do not bind the court, nor do they explain the decisions.
Close study of the cases, and particularly examination of all of the facts before the judge, emphasizes not only the emptiness of the doctrines, but a 275. The lawyer's willingness to take these cases for the purpose of obtaining clients in nonlabor cases plays a far greater role in internal union litigation than is commonly recognized. Members of railroad or seamen's unions have less difficulty in obtaining counsel than members of other unions because their claims for work injuries are not restricted by workmen's compensation and hold promise of substantial contingent fees. The lawyer who handled two cases involving lone individuals indicated that he took the cases because the individuals whom he represented had personal injury claims which assured the lawyer that his fee for the discipline case would be paid.
276. If the real defendant is the international, even a large group within the local is faced with the greatest difficulties. Lawyers for the international need spare no expense, delay, or diversionary tactic, and these may be supplemented by imposing a trusteeship on the local and thereby vastly enlarging the litigation as well as frustrating the opposition in gaining control. willingness of the New York courts to create a body of law regulating union discipline. The pattern which emerges contains at least five marked elements, which at times coalesce and at times clash. First, a recognition of the value of union membership as a right to participate in union affairs, wholly apart from its importance in obtaining employment. Second, a strong concern for protecting free play of the democratic process in the political life of the union, including virulent criticism of union officers and organized opposition groups within the union. Third, an overriding hostility to communists or communist tainted factions within the union. Fourth, a stern insistence on the essential elements of procedural due process in union trials, including freedom of union tribunals from discernable bias. Fifth, a limited confidence in union appellate procedures and small reluctance to delay intervention while they work their way. These are the principal elements which, applied to the facts actually before the court, guide the decision.
This pattern, though clearly discernible, is neither boldly nor cleanly etched. Incantation of traditional doctrines dominates judicial opinions, even though the premises of those doctrines are contradicted by the pattern pricked by the decisions. Random cases violate the pattern, for unperceptive judges are deceived by language which obscures the result, and these vagrant decisions in turn blur the prevailing pattern. The insistence on procedural due process has not been disguised by doctrine, but has been boldly declared by the courts. In this area the lines have been drawn in greater detail and followed with greater consistency. Protecting political freedoms within the union has long been achieved by manipulating the contract theory, and this subterfuge has led to uneven protection. Madden v. Atkins, however, has now stripped away the veil of language and forthrightly protected these rights. Judges can now see clearly their responsibility and face squarely the difficult task of marking out the details. The degree of deference given to union appellate tribunals is almost wholly obscured by the consuming exceptions to the exhaustion rule, and it is here that the results have been most erratic.
The active role assumed by the courts in protecting individual rights and democratic processes within the union raises inevitably the critical question of the courts' competence to fill this role. This study provides no definitive answer, but close examination of what courts do, in contrast to what they say, tends strongly to dispel many doubts.
First, the court can and does obtain a full picture of the facts, including the underlying internal union conflict which gave rise to the discipline. Affidavits supporting motions for an injunction paint the picture in vivid terms, lawyers' arguments on those motions emphasize the facts rather than the law, and the nonjury trials are not, in practice, inhibited by restrictive rules of evidence. The judicial process thus permits, if not encourages, full development of the facts. Second, many judges have shown substantial competence in understanding the internal workings of unions. Some of the most puzzling cases reveal, upon closer scrutiny of the full factual picture, remarkable judicial insight. Disci-pline cases grow largely out of contests for political power, and the judge's own political experience often develops in him a special sensitivity to the problems involved. He knows the devices available, can see through disguised manipulation, and understands the needs for protection. The political process is in his area of expertness.
Third, judicial remedies are as effective as any the law knows. Temporary injunctions can be obtained without delay, even in a matter of hours where necessary. With interim protection, delay in trials and appeals becomes relatively unimportant. The cases examined show that judicial remedies are in fact much faster than most administrative remedies. The critical factor in judicial remedies is the willingness of the court to give interim protection with a temporary injunction, and at this point most courts have not displayed undue caution. The one inherent weakness is the cost of litigation and this becomes a serious problem for the isolated individual who can find no faction to champion his cause.
This study has focused solely on the handling of union discipline cases in the New York courts, and the conclusions drawn here may not be entirely valid in other states. The New York cases, however, are of first importance for they represent almost half of the reported opinions, and New York has historically provided many of the leading cases in the area of internal union affairs. The courts of other states have used the same doctrinal logic and have at times transparently manipulated it in the same way to reach the many of the same results. A similar study in other states might well reveal similar variance between the language of published opinions and actual disposition of the cases.
The willingness of New York courts to intervene in unions is not rooted in any special judicial hostility to unions. On the contrary, the legal climate in New York has long been relatively favorable to unions, and unions wield considerable political power even in the selection of judges. The study does not show that judges in highly unionized areas are more reluctant to intervene in internal union disputes than judges in nonunion areas, or that there is any parallel between willingness to issue labor injunctions and the willingness to enjoin union discipline.
New York is unusual only in the amount of experience which its judges have had in internal union cases-probably more than judges in any other state. Moreover, this is heavily concentrated, for over half of all the cases in the entire state are handled by the Supreme Court of Manhattan County. The judges of this court have had an opportunity to acquire a special expertise. Insofar as this concentration of experience affects the overall pattern, it may give added weight to the New York cases as guides to other states and to the federal courts who must give body and vigor to the skeletal provisions of the federal statute.
